Anyone

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/50803841

Canada helped build local government capacity in Ukraine before the war. The Council of Europe’s Congress has now called on the world to do so again. Canada should answer that call.

Op-ed by Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada.

[...]

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recently called for local and national authorities to work together to help Ukraine recover and rebuild four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.

The message is clear: cities and regions must lead, and their counterparts around the world should help them do it. The congress also calls on Russia to pay for the damage it has caused, pointing to frozen Russian assets worldwide as one source for those funds — an acknowledgment that recovery cannot wait for the war to end, since communities are already rebuilding under fire.

[...]

Behind every statistic is a community struggling to survive — a mayor trying to keep schools open under missile attacks; a municipal council managing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons with dwindling resources; a city engineer repairing the same water system for the third time after it was bombed yet again.

[...]

Local and regional authorities across Ukraine face these situations every day. And it is precisely because the challenges are so local — tied to specific communities and capacities — that the response must also be local.

Ukrainian decentralization reforms since 2014 have expanded the fiscal capacity of the country’s municipalities, enabling them to respond to the unprecedented shocks of war far more effectively than before. In fact, local budget revenues quintupled between 2014 and 2021.

Russia’s [full-scale] invasion disrupted these reforms.

[...]

The call to action by the congress asks local and regional authorities in Council of Europe member states to use “existing co-operation platforms and bilateral partnerships to offer practical support to their Ukrainian counterparts.”

It’s an appeal for cities that have solved difficult problems — managing mass displacement, rebuilding after disaster, reforming service delivery — to share what they know with Ukrainian cities doing the same under fire.

City-to-city partnerships are fundamentally different from top-down aid. They are peer relationships built on what scholars call horizontal assistance — the exchange of practical knowledge and structural social capital between cities navigating similar challenges.

[...]

History offers clear guidance on what works. Comparative analysis of post-war and post-disaster reconstruction experiences identifies local community engagement and bottom-up leadership as the single most consistent factor separating successful from failed reconstruction.

[...]

Canada has been here before. Beginning in 2010, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), financed by the Canadian government through Global Affairs Canada, built exactly this kind of peer network in Ukraine through the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance.

The $19.5-million, six-year initiative worked directly with 16 Ukrainian cities to strengthen local democracy, support small and medium-sized businesses and advance decentralization.

FCM’s municipal experts worked alongside counterparts in cities like Lviv and Dnipro, co-publishing Ukraine’s first municipal guide to local economic development and helping local governments design collaborative regional projects. A key partner throughout was the Association of Ukrainian Cities, a key municipal advocacy organization.

That program ended, but the relationships it built did not. And the decentralization reforms it supported are now widely credited — by the congress’s call to action itself, the OECD and scholars of Ukrainian resilience — with giving Ukrainian local authorities the capacity to respond as effectively as they have to the shocks of war.

[...]

Canada helped build local government capacity in Ukraine before the war. The Council of Europe’s Congress has now called on the world to do so again. Canada should answer that call.

Op-ed by Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada.

[...]

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recently called for local and national authorities to work together to help Ukraine recover and rebuild four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country.

The message is clear: cities and regions must lead, and their counterparts around the world should help them do it. The congress also calls on Russia to pay for the damage it has caused, pointing to frozen Russian assets worldwide as one source for those funds — an acknowledgment that recovery cannot wait for the war to end, since communities are already rebuilding under fire.

[...]

Behind every statistic is a community struggling to survive — a mayor trying to keep schools open under missile attacks; a municipal council managing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons with dwindling resources; a city engineer repairing the same water system for the third time after it was bombed yet again.

[...]

Local and regional authorities across Ukraine face these situations every day. And it is precisely because the challenges are so local — tied to specific communities and capacities — that the response must also be local.

Ukrainian decentralization reforms since 2014 have expanded the fiscal capacity of the country’s municipalities, enabling them to respond to the unprecedented shocks of war far more effectively than before. In fact, local budget revenues quintupled between 2014 and 2021.

Russia’s [full-scale] invasion disrupted these reforms.

[...]

The call to action by the congress asks local and regional authorities in Council of Europe member states to use “existing co-operation platforms and bilateral partnerships to offer practical support to their Ukrainian counterparts.”

It’s an appeal for cities that have solved difficult problems — managing mass displacement, rebuilding after disaster, reforming service delivery — to share what they know with Ukrainian cities doing the same under fire.

City-to-city partnerships are fundamentally different from top-down aid. They are peer relationships built on what scholars call horizontal assistance — the exchange of practical knowledge and structural social capital between cities navigating similar challenges.

[...]

History offers clear guidance on what works. Comparative analysis of post-war and post-disaster reconstruction experiences identifies local community engagement and bottom-up leadership as the single most consistent factor separating successful from failed reconstruction.

[...]

Canada has been here before. Beginning in 2010, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), financed by the Canadian government through Global Affairs Canada, built exactly this kind of peer network in Ukraine through the Partnership for Local Economic Development and Democratic Governance.

The $19.5-million, six-year initiative worked directly with 16 Ukrainian cities to strengthen local democracy, support small and medium-sized businesses and advance decentralization.

FCM’s municipal experts worked alongside counterparts in cities like Lviv and Dnipro, co-publishing Ukraine’s first municipal guide to local economic development and helping local governments design collaborative regional projects. A key partner throughout was the Association of Ukrainian Cities, a key municipal advocacy organization.

That program ended, but the relationships it built did not. And the decentralization reforms it supported are now widely credited — by the congress’s call to action itself, the OECD and scholars of Ukrainian resilience — with giving Ukrainian local authorities the capacity to respond as effectively as they have to the shocks of war.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43807418

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A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43807418

...

A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

...

A key component of the study [to be conducted in Romania] is the characterisation of low-conflict sites—areas with minimal risk to biodiversity and communities and which meet essential technical criteria for renewable energy development. These areas are broader than the RAAs defined in Directive (EU) 2023/2413, and while not all low-conflict sites will become RAAs, mapping them nationwide will support responsible renewable deployment both within and beyond designated acceleration zones.

...

Beyond identifying low-conflict areas for clean energy development, the study will serve as a dialogue platform bringing together national and local authorities, grid operators, energy associations, academia and civil society. This collaborative space will help address challenges, share perspectives and strengthen informed decision-making in shaping Romania’s renewable energy future.

...

This is an op-ed by Sir Niall Ferguson, Milbank Family senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and Moritz Schularick is president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Archived / Unpaywalled

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Germany’s rearmament is not going nearly fast enough. While Germany and Europe urgently need more weapons, at the current pace it will take years for them to roll off the production line and to constitute an arsenal sufficient to deter Russia. In no other area will Germany invest as much money in the coming years. And in no area is the absence of economic rationality more pronounced. Without swift changes, Germany is on a path to waste billions in taxpayers’ money for the delayed delivery of partly outdated defence capabilities.

Nearly four years after Russia’s assault on Ukraine, large German defence producers still work in single shifts, five days a week, instead of three shifts, seven days a week. The current production rate for the Taurus long-range guided missile system is only a few a month. The production of the Iris-T air defence system — which could provide crucial support to defend Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this winter and which is also essential for closing gaps in Europe’s air defence — is positively artisanal.

...

At its heart, this is a task of industrial scaling, something German industry is well placed to deliver. As economic historians, we know that without the coordinating hand of the government and economic expertise, this kind of crash rearmament programme will not happen fast enough. ... the obvious path would be to create a national defence industrial board to assess resources, set quantitative production goals, negotiate capacity with industry and fast-track dual-use innovation. ... "German rearmament" are two ominous words for historians, just as "state co-ordination" is a phrase we tend to eschew as believers in freemarket economics. However, in the face of an increasingly dangerous and heavily armed Russia, co-ordinated rearmament is imperative. Above all, it needs to happen at warp speed. ...

Berlin has woken up to the Russian threat, but its thinking is stuck in the past ... British readers of a certain age may find it hard to be enthusiastic about German rearmament. As historians, we understand their unease. However, this is not the 1910s or the 1930s. The 2020s are a time when the UK has been in a mutual defence alliance with Germany for close to 80 years; ... The arguments for a more rapid and technologically advanced German rearmament are more than just narrowly military. They are also economic and strategic. We have four recommendations that add up to an "Operation Warp Speed" for German rearmament. ...

...

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41645330

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41645330

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

Archived version

Here is s brief summary by a news agency: Chinese goods dumping started before tariffs, ECB study finds

Weak domestic demand appears to be the missing link in explaining China’s strong exports to Europe – more so than tariff-related trade diversion, according to an analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB).

Escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe. However, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China's crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41530810

Migrants in Europe stand by the basic values of democracy, according to a new study by the University of Mannheim in Germany.

“Our results show: immigrants support the core democratic principles to a similarly high degree as people without a migratory background,” says Professor Marc Helbling, sociologist at the University of Mannheim focusing on Migration and Integration and Executive Board member of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

You find the download link for the study here: Liberal democratic values among immigrants in Europe: Socialisation and adaptation processes

Helbling and his team analyzed data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the SVR’s [Expert Council on Integration and Migration's] German Integration Barometer.

High support for democratic basic values all over Europe

The results of the study show that both migrants from democratic countries of origin and those from authoritarian countries are highly supportive of core democratic norms, such as free elections, equal rights, minority protection, and independent courts. On the ESS scale from 0 to 10, the mean level of support for these values throughout Europe is at 8.56 for migrants. For non-migrants, the level of support is at 8.48. For Germany in particular, the Integration Barometer data with a scale from 0 to 3 show very similar values, more specifically 2.67 and 2.66. “These, in all cases, very high mean values hardly differ between the individual groups of people,” Helbling explains.

Experience with democracy in country of origin has a positive effect

The research team found a small but statistically significant difference between immigrants from highly authoritarian countries, such as Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, on the one hand and migrants from more democratic countries, such as India, Turkey, or Romania, on the other. “People who have lived in a very authoritarian system for many years tend to develop slightly weaker democratic attitudes. Conversely, people who have lived in more democratic countries for a long time show a bit more support for democracy. However, the difference is really small,” Helbling explains. “In principle, democratic basic beliefs are shared across cultural and national borders and, as a rule, solidified with increasing democratic life experience,” the social scientist sums up.

Problematic minorities within all groups

Despite the overall high level of support for democracy, there is a small minority among immigrants who reject it. According to the researchers, the share of this group accounts for a medium single-digit percentage. This value is almost exactly the same as the one for people without a migratory background, Helbling emphasizes: “Our analyses show that anti-democratic attitudes are not specifically a migration-related phenomenon. There are critical minorities within all population groups.”

...

Migrants in Europe stand by the basic values of democracy, according to a new study by the University of Mannheim in Germany.

“Our results show: immigrants support the core democratic principles to a similarly high degree as people without a migratory background,” says Professor Marc Helbling, sociologist at the University of Mannheim focusing on Migration and Integration and Executive Board member of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).

You find the download link for the study here: Liberal democratic values among immigrants in Europe: Socialisation and adaptation processes

Helbling and his team analyzed data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the SVR’s [Expert Council on Integration and Migration's] German Integration Barometer.

High support for democratic basic values all over Europe

The results of the study show that both migrants from democratic countries of origin and those from authoritarian countries are highly supportive of core democratic norms, such as free elections, equal rights, minority protection, and independent courts. On the ESS scale from 0 to 10, the mean level of support for these values throughout Europe is at 8.56 for migrants. For non-migrants, the level of support is at 8.48. For Germany in particular, the Integration Barometer data with a scale from 0 to 3 show very similar values, more specifically 2.67 and 2.66. “These, in all cases, very high mean values hardly differ between the individual groups of people,” Helbling explains.

Experience with democracy in country of origin has a positive effect

The research team found a small but statistically significant difference between immigrants from highly authoritarian countries, such as Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, on the one hand and migrants from more democratic countries, such as India, Turkey, or Romania, on the other. “People who have lived in a very authoritarian system for many years tend to develop slightly weaker democratic attitudes. Conversely, people who have lived in more democratic countries for a long time show a bit more support for democracy. However, the difference is really small,” Helbling explains. “In principle, democratic basic beliefs are shared across cultural and national borders and, as a rule, solidified with increasing democratic life experience,” the social scientist sums up.

Problematic minorities within all groups

Despite the overall high level of support for democracy, there is a small minority among immigrants who reject it. According to the researchers, the share of this group accounts for a medium single-digit percentage. This value is almost exactly the same as the one for people without a migratory background, Helbling emphasizes: “Our analyses show that anti-democratic attitudes are not specifically a migration-related phenomenon. There are critical minorities within all population groups.”

...