I've been thinking about the same kinds of arguments today, too.
Another line of reasoning I'm too tired to fully lay out right now but that I've seen elsewhere and I think is compelling:
Israel's history of targeted assassinations and arbitrary imprisonment of activists in the occupied Palestinian territories, taken together with the fact of the Oct 7 attack itself, proves that the state of Israel doesn't know who or where the Hamas leaders they supposedly want to target are. So the only 'targeting' they can do is indiscriminate, and the only end point of their bombing campaign is total destruction. And this is borne out in the rhetoric of many officials and much of the Israeli public, and of course in the atrocious, ongoing violence the IDF is right now carrying out.
The impossible goal becomes an excuse for 'no red lines' because no matter how far they go, they can always say they are still not done. This dovetails as well with the analogizing of Oct 7 as an 'Israeli 9/11', the 'War on Terror', and the USA's forever wars in the Middle East.
But your point about the reflexive brutality, the observation that somehow a military response is the only one considered or undertaken here, is also extremely vital. Because part of the rationalization here is absolutely this idea that 'there was no choice', given the desire to uproot Hamas. But of course that's bullshit.
This is similar to Marx's critique of freedom under liberalism as merely 'formal'. The problem is the gap between that can exist between a nominal right and practical exercise of that right.
This kind of problem is common with rights-based approaches to justice and can be witnessed with human rights broadly. Its identification isn't unique to Marxism, either; liberals sometimes get at it with the phrase 'equality of opportunity', for example. To say that opportunities can be unequal (and that this is a problem) is to admit that justice requires the guarantee of more than just formal rights. I'd say this a problem that has shaped liberal 'privilege' discourse as well: privilege is just such a kind of gap that allows (or constitutes?) the persistence of injustice in the face of nominal/formal/legal equality.
Like in other cases, I'd say that the four fundamental software freedoms get at something genuinely important, and that it's better to have them, even just formally, than not. But like with other freedoms and rights, it's easy to conceive of them too 'thinly'. They need to be fleshed out with a more general awareness of power relations and of the practicality of their own exercise.
To some extent, that awareness of software freedom as situated within power relations is actually already present in free software discourses, which talk often of things like subordination, domination, subjugation, etc., from the start. Unsurprisingly, that dimension is largely absent from the 'open-source' perspective.