davel

The UN Security Council on Tuesday failed to adopt a Bahrain-led measure aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz, with China and Russia blocking a watered-down version of a resolution that initially authorized the use of force.

Bahrain's Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani said the resolution was intended as "a step toward a permanent solution that will ensure navigational freedom in the Strait of Hormuz."

“Failing to adopt this resolution sends the wrong signal to the world,” Zayani said.

There were 11 votes in favor, including Bahrain and permanent members the United States, France and the United Kingdom, with abstentions from Colombia and Pakistan. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama and Somalia also voted to pass the resolution.

The vote came hours before President Donald Trump’s deadline for Iran to reopen the strait or endure strikes on its civilian infrastructure. He warned in a post on Truth Social Tuesday morning, “A whole civilization will die tonight," if no deal is reached.

In remarks following the vote, US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz accused Moscow and China of backing “a regime that seeks to intimidate the Gulf into submission.”

Paywall bypass: https://archive.ph/vP9rn

The U.S. military has fired more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles in four weeks of war with Iran, burning through the precision weapons at a rate that has alarmed some Pentagon officials and prompted internal discussions about how to make more available, said people familiar with the matter.

The missiles, which can be launched from Navy surface warships and submarines, have been a staple of U.S. military attacks since they were first used in combat in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. But only a few hundred are manufactured each year, meaning the global supply is limited. The Pentagon does not publicly disclose how many missiles are in its inventory at any one time.

Tomahawks are prized in part because they can travel more than 1,000 miles, reducing the need to send American pilots into well-defended airspace. The heavy reliance on them in the Iran conflict will require urgent discussions about whether to relocate some from other parts of the world, including the Indo-Pacific, and a concerted long-term effort to build more, said several U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military planning.

The dilemma has laid bare broader concerns in both the Pentagon and Congress about the Trump administration’s war in Iran, its shifting explanations for why the conflict is necessary, and the risks a shortage could pose to the United States as it balances the potential for future conflict in other parts of the world. It comes as the White House deliberates over a possible major escalation in Iran, to include the use of ground troops, while pursuing negotiations to end hostilities.

Paywall bypass: https://archive.ph/dkPyt

ON MARCH 24TH, with the rescheduled launch of Artemis II just a week away, NASA unveiled a drastic shake-up of the entire Artemis lunar programme. The centrepiece was a detailed plan to build a permanent base near the lunar south pole. Artemis II will send four astronauts around the Moon for the first time in more than 50 years, the opening mission of a programme designed to return Americans to the lunar surface by 2028, ahead of China.

The plan is the most serious American commitment to the Moon since Apollo, built for permanence through iteration rather than a single grand gesture of flags and footprints. But the political logic funding it is a different story.

In Washington, the case for the base is almost entirely competitive: beat China, don’t cede the Moon. That framing has been politically effective. Competition with China was the reason nuclear power for the lunar surface appeared in NASA’s budget for the first time in decades. It is probably what forced the Artemis restructuring. It concentrates congressional attention, loosens appropriations and gives the agency leverage it has not had since Apollo. No honest accounting of how this base came to exist can omit the role of competitive pressure.

But “We’re building this because of China” is not the same as “We’re building this because it serves American interests regardless of what a competitor does.” One is a political accelerant, the other a foundation. Accelerants burn out. A programme that takes decades to complete needs both.

America has tested this. In the 1960s it built the most extraordinary exploration programme in history, landed on the Moon six times—and then walked away. Not because the technology failed, but because the competitive rationale that sustained it had been satisfied. America forfeited half a century of lunar presence because the race was over.

Some will argue that, unlike with the Soviet Union, competition with China is structural and lasting. Perhaps. But the cold war itself lasted four decades, and the Moon was a priority for fewer than ten of those years. Enduring rivalry does not guarantee enduring attention to any single programme. The competitive gaze shifts. NASA’s new plan, much better in its architecture, is vulnerable to the same fate if competition with China remains its only load-bearing wall.

To be clear: this is not an argument against using competitive framing to get the programme funded. It is an argument against relying on that framing alone. If the race with China is the sole foundation, a budget crisis, a change in administration or even an unexpected thaw with Beijing could see funding for the base cut. A programme of that scale needs a broader political coalition than competitive anxiety can provide.

Edit to add paywall bypass: https://archive.ph/3Son4

As the United States and Israel prepared to go to war with Iran, the head of Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, went to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with a plan.

Within days of the war’s beginning, said David Barnea, the Mossad chief, his service would likely be able to galvanize the Iranian opposition — igniting riots and other acts of rebellion that could even lead to the collapse of Iran’s government. Mr. Barnea also presented the proposal to senior Trump administration officials during a visit to Washington in mid-January.

Mr. Netanyahu adopted the plan. Despite doubts about its viability among senior American officials and some officials in other Israeli intelligence agencies, both he and President Trump seemed to embrace an optimistic outlook. Killing Iran’s leaders at the outset of the conflict, followed by a series of intelligence operations intended to encourage regime change, they thought, could lead to a mass uprising that might bring about a swift end to the war.

Three weeks into the war, an Iranian uprising has not yet materialized. American and Israeli intelligence assessments have concluded that the theocratic Iranian government is weakened but intact, and that widespread fear of Iran’s military and police forces has dampened prospects both for nascent rebellion in the country and for ethnic militias outside of Iran to launch cross-border incursions.

So the NYT is talking about this war, not the last September’s Six-Day War. Previously:

The “protesters” were mercenaries & rioters led by the CIA & Mossad to kill civilians & police and to seize or set fire to government buildings. It was the standard faux color revolution playbook for regime change that the US has been using since at least the 1980s.

One reason they keep using it is because you keep falling for it.

• Western Media Whitewashes Deadly Riots in Iran
• Meet the former fashion blogger and shady doctor behind the ‘30,000 dead’ Iran psy-op
• How Tehran Neutralised Starlink and Foiled Washington's Colour Revolution playbook
• The blueprint of regime change operations

The reading group is using the Penguin edition, translated by Ben Fowkes with an introduction by Ernest Mandel.

They’re basically minimum-viable products that by design can be used to violate the law in California when the Act goes into effect on Jan. 1, 2027.