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In 1920, there were already rumors within the Somali community that the province would be evacuated immediately so that local British officials had to assure Somali leaders that no transfer would take place that year. In July, Northey, back in Nairobi once again, expressed his misgivings about the proposed treaty. He informed Milner that the Somalis were unhappy with the cession.
Sir Edward warned of the possibility that the Somalis would quit the ceded territory en masse and settle further west in the NFD near the Lorian Swamp and Tana River Valley in British territory at the expense of the present inhabitants of these areas. Such a contingency would have to be considered should Somalis then living in affected areas be allowed to retain British nationality.
Less convincingly, the EAP Governor resurrected the threat of a Somali rebellion led by the exiled Cabdiraxmaan Mursal, who had led an uprising during World War I, to fortify his opposition to the transfer.¹⁸ As a consequence, Northey expressed anxiety that Italian‐administered Somalis in the northern part of Jubaland might get out of control. He even cautioned that they might join Ethiopians (an unrealistic scenario despite tension along the frontier and a spate of cross‐border murders in 1919–1920) to menace the NFD.
Finally, the Governor requested that London make public a statement on the cession so that Jubaland’s inhabitants would know where they stood, rather than allowing the information to come from the Italians.¹⁹
The above correspondence is noteworthy, not because the Colonial Office was seriously concerned about an uprising originating in Italian territory or on account of the public announcement concerning Jubaland that Northey himself later made. Instead, the exchange mattered because it broached the ticklish question of how the cession of British territory should affect Africans who were British subjects.
If the Somalis were to be treated as subjects of the Crown, they, like the few Europeans and Asians in Jubaland, should have had the right to move into British territory. Unfortunately, the colonial authorities considered the Somalis unappreciative of the blessings brought about by their subjugation. Viscount Milner was consequently against allowing the Somalis to withdraw from the ceded lands but did not know how to prevent them from doing just that if they strongly opposed being horse‐traded to the [Kingdom of Italy].
Meanwhile, the secretary of state for the colonies turned to the Foreign Office for its views on how to keep the Italians from getting upset if the Somalis chose to enter British territory after the cession.²⁰ Officials there offered some promise in their opinion that it was as much the responsibility of the Italians to prevent the Somalis from leaving their territory as it was for the British to bar their coming.²¹
[…]
The […] breakthrough on the cession of Jubaland to [Fascist] Italy finally occurred far away in Britain under the new Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin when Parliament passed the East African Territories Bill in December 1924.⁷³ Even this was not a totally bloodless affair as the callous treatment meted out by colonial authorities on the Somalis elicited condemnation in the House of Commons.
Criticism arose over two articles in the treaty, namely, Article 6, which specifically excluded Somalis from possessing British nationality, and Article 9, which sought to prevent movement across the new international frontier.⁷⁴
One member of Parliament (MP) characterized the former clause as “an intolerable provision” because it treated the Africans “like cattle in an area infected by foot‐and‐mouth disease.” Another MP objected to the latter caveat calling it “a grave restriction of the liberties of these peoples.” Secretary of State for the Colonies Leopold Amery, who had taken office in November, was forced to defend the tainted treaty.
Justifying the accord, he speciously argued that consultation with the Somalis, who lived their lives beyond the control of any government, was impossible. More importantly (but even less forthrightly), he claimed that the restrictions on movement across the international boundary were for the Somalis’ own good since there was not enough room for them to subsist on the British side of the frontier. Hence, such a shift would cause a “grave disturbance with other Somalis across the border.”
After such debate and without the consent of the affected Somalis, the British government in December 1924 decided on the transfer of what had become nearly 34,000 square miles of African soil to another European government.⁷⁵
Back in the African periphery, the Somalis did not go gentle into that goodnight. Before the cession of Jubaland to [Fascist] Italy could take place, fighting broke out in February 1925 between cattle‐holding Maxamad Subeer and Harti, both Darood sub‐clans, over watering rights in which thirty of the latter were killed at Deshek Wama.⁷⁶ When A. Hastings Horne, the Jubaland senior commissioner, sent two chiefs and some armed constabulary to calm the situation, one of the headmen was killed and the other just barely escaped with his life.
Fearing that this internecine dispute might somehow explode into a revolt, Horne, the KAR commander of the nearby Gobwen (Goobweyn or “big place” in Somali) garrison, and forty‐seven askaris swiftly moved into the area only to discover at least five thousand Maxamad Subeer, “defiant” and apparently beyond the control of their chiefs.
[…]
The Maxamad Subeer “revolt” was an unwelcome development and certainly the last obstacle that British authorities wanted to see before Jubaland was transferred to [Fascist] Italy. With the episode behind him at the end of March, Acting‐Governor Denham wired London recommending that the province be ceded without delay. It would, of course, be necessary to delimit a new international boundary, but Denham urged that this be done after the transfer.⁸⁷
As Lieutenant Colonel King bore witness at the beginning of this article, the handover finally occurred on June 29, 1925. […] While it is true that officials in London and Rome concluded the diplomatic agreement that led to the transfer of Jubaland into [Fascist] hands, the rôle that Nairobi and especially frontier officials played in these developments proved more important than has heretofore been acknowledged by those who have been preoccupied with decision‐makers and developments in Europe when they have sought to relate the multifaceted history of colonial Africa.
(Emphasis added.)