The Zionist intelligentsia was keenly aware of the colonial politics of its time. Zionist newspapers reported widely on the Second Boer War (1899–1902),⁶ the Italian Invasion of Libya (1911)⁷ and Ethiopia (1935),⁸ the war against the Herero and Nama in South-West Africa (1904–8),⁹ the Indian anti-colonial struggle,¹⁰ and even Japanese imperial expansion.¹¹
Especially after the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Zionist commentators attempted to articulate their demands and grievances by referring to other colonies, both settler and non-settler. The term ‘settler colonialism’ was not widely used at the time, but some Zionist commentators employed a basic division between exploitation and work colonies, based on Karl Kautsky’s Socialism and Colonial Policy.¹²
Moreover, the distinction between non-settler colonies and settler states, dominions, and colonies was embedded in the Zionist discourse because North America, South Africa, and Australia/New Zealand were major destinations for Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe (and Palestine) while non-settler colonies were not.¹³
Consequently, North America and Australia/New Zealand held an ambivalent position in the Zionist discourse: They were seen as sources of inspiration for the Zionist project in Palestine, but also as fierce competitors for Jewish immigration (South Africa was an exception for reasons that will be discussed below).
The second major argument of this article is that most involved Zionist comparisons, especially after 1917, focused on Britain’s African settler colonies. Before the issue of the Balfour Declaration, the World Zionist Organization was dominated by German, and to a lesser extent, French experts who imported their respective empires’ colonial models to Palestine.¹⁴
The First World War saw a changing of the guard, with Chaim Weizmann and Ze’ev Jabotinsky leading a new generation of Anglophile Zionist leaders. The Balfour Declaration and the establishment of the Mandate then made Palestine and the Zionist movement part of the British Empire. Thus, comparisons with anglophone colonialism took precedence over other empires.
[…]
Perhaps the best illustration of Zionist colonial envy is a 1929 Jabotinsky op-ed about settler politics in Northern Rhodesia. A few Rhodesian policies caught his eye: first, according to Jabotinsky, the head of the colony was appointed by a charter company, which was a private company ‘just like the Zionist Organization’.¹⁰ For Jabotinsky, this justified the Zionist demand that the WZO should have a say in picking the high commissioner for Palestine.⁶¹
Secondly, as a fervid opponent of the British initiative to establish a Legislative Council with significant Palestinian representation in Palestine, he noted that the North Rhodesian Legislative Council was entirely white, despite the fact that the settlers comprised no more than five per cent of the population.⁶²
Finally, Jabotinsky repeatedly criticized the Mandate Government for not availing state lands for Jewish use and called for the expropriation of uncultivated private land.⁶³ To support his argument that the Mandate Government should give state lands to Jewish settlers, he mentioned in the article that Kenyan and Rhodesian settlers received government land for free.⁶⁴
[…]
As part of his ongoing anxiety about imperial fatigue, Jabotinsky was also aware that the legitimacy of settler colonialism was fading. In a 1932 diary entry, he noted that the argument that America was colonized against the will of the natives — and thus native consent was not needed to legitimize the colonization of Palestine — no longer held sway among the British.
Jabotinsky criticized as ineffectual the often-repeated Zionist claim that colonization was beneficial for Palestine and mentioned that it did not work for the Japanese who attempted to justify their conquest of Manchuria. He then suggested that Zionists switch arguments — they were not colonizers on a civilizing mission but rather ‘the real natives’ of Palestine, who were once forcibly expelled and are now returning to their homeland.⁷⁷ Although Jabotinsky continued to identify with white settlers across the globe, his successors would reimagine themselves as anti-colonial natives in the 1940s.
[…]
Another expression of the crumbling Zionist-British alliance was the growing volume of complaints that the British were treating Jews ‘like natives’, with the word ‘natives’ transliterated into Hebrew even though a Hebrew term denoting indigenous people — yelidim — was already widely in use.⁸⁷
The injunction to not be treated like natives conveyed Jewish settlers’ growing anxiety about their uncertain place in the British Empire, and in this sense, it was a different articulation of the anxieties expressed in comparisons to other settler colonies from the 1920s and 1930s. But whereas in the 1920s and 1930s Zionists complained about being second-class settlers, their 1940s’ complaints reflect a fear of losing their settler status altogether.
After 1939, British policy restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases. When Zionist militias began attacking British infrastructure and personnel, the Mandate Government responded with violent sweeps, curfews, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment — all of which had been previously used on Palestinian rebels, often with Zionist encouragement.⁸⁸
The loss (or at least diminution) of its settler privileges on the one hand, and British violent repression on the other, caused an identity crisis among the Zionist intelligentsia. Most Zionist politicians and intellectuals were fully aware of the racial hierarchy of the British Empire. As the Labor Zionist columnist Ari Ankorion explained in 1929, the word native was not a neutral name for indigenous people. It specifically denoted a culturally inferior colonized person with little or no rights.⁸⁹
Moreover, they were very familiar with the British suppression of multiple Palestinian uprisings. The Zionists who felt that they were being treated like natives understood and feared the consequences of losing their status as settlers, not only practically but also culturally: To lose one’s settler status in the colonies was often akin to losing one’s claim to be European.
[…]
In the mid and late 1940s, as the British-Zionist conflict became increasingly violent and it became clear that the Jewish state would not be part of the empire, the Zionist meta-narrative shifted and adopted an almost classically postcolonial form: Zionists now imagined themselves as a colonized community, oppressed by an evil empire that was illegally occupying Palestine.⁹⁴
This shift created some striking dissonance in the way in which Zionists understood themselves. As we have seen, in 1929 Jabotinsky compared the Jewish Agency to the British South Africa Company, a charter company founded by Cecil Rhodes. In 1946, in contrast, the Revisionist columnist Yohanan Bader compared it to an African ‘native authority’.⁹⁵
It is clear, then, that how Zionists contextualized their experience in Palestine was highly contingent on their relationship with Britain. This goes against much of the nationalist ‘postcolonial’ mainstream historiography of Zionism, which tends to present the Zionist-British relationship as short-lived, transactional, and largely antagonistic, and thus not particularly important to the formation of Zionist identity (more on this in the conclusion).
And yet, this was not how many Zionists experienced this relationship in real time. The most important Zionist leaders, whether they were ‘for’ or ‘against’ the empire, had an intense intellectual and affective relationship with Britain. Studying colonial comparisons has allowed us to recover some aspects of this intense relationship.