cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/8321525
This may prevent a unified position on a legally binding and substantial Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
As the Philippines prepared to assume chairmanship of the ASEAN in December last year, it announced one of its priorities: to conclude the contentious decades-long negotiations on the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea. Soon after, something unexpected happened. The Chinese Embassy in Manila dusted off its old “wolf warrior” diplomacy playbook, hurling insults at government officials—from senators to the spokesperson of the Philippine Coast Guard—who criticized China’s aggressive behavior and unrelenting rhetoric on its “ownership” of a large swath of the South China Sea (SCS), including the West Philippine Sea, which lies within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
However, the US-Israeli war on Iran–which has resulted in an energy crisis in the Philippines–led to a change of tone in Manila-Beijing relations, an apparent softening of stance by the Marcos government.
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The area referred to is Reed Bank, which is rich in oil and gas resources and lies within the Philippines’ EEZ. For many years, China has blocked the Philippines from exploring in this area, insisting on “joint development” with China as its partner. In the latest bilateral consultation mechanism held in late March in Quanzhou, the two countries discussed initial exchanges on potential energy cooperation, particularly oil and gas exploration. This is likely among the issues to be discussed in the planned meeting of the foreign ministers of both countries within the year.
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Still, China’s disinformation campaign continues with three key targets:
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First, it wants to quiet down Manila's transparency policy. The current strategy where the Philippines publicizes incidents of Chinese harassment in the West Philippine Sea—a name-and-shame campaign–started in 2023 during Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s presidency. This policy, anchored on the Philippines' 2016 legal victory in which an international arbitration court junked China’s excessive nine-dash line claim as having no legal basis, is aimed at gathering international and domestic support for the Philippine government.
Second, China wants its nine-dash line narrative to prevail in the court of public opinion. Despite Manila’s insistence that its neighboring hegemon abide by international law as laid out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the arbitral ruling, China refused to participate in the arbitration case filed by Manila in 2013 and has consistently rejected the decision of the arbitration court. Beijing’s tactic is to repeat its illegitimate claim over the South China Sea countless times until it is perceived as true, albeit being a signatory to UNCLOS.
Third, Beijing appears to be undermining Manila’s leadership as the latter presides over what it aims to be the final stretch of talks on the COC. China is against a COC that is legally binding because it would constrain it from enforcing its claims. If concluded, the COC would set the rules of behavior in the contested waters and prevent miscalculations between the disputing parties.
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Beijing has chosen to unleash its combative style of diplomacy. While many parts of the world, especially in the West, experienced “wolf warrior diplomacy” in recent years (from 2019 to 2021), the wave has just reached the Philippines.
Political scientist Chong Ja Ian thinks that wolf warrior diplomacy was rooted in the tensions in the South China Sea and buttressed by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim.
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At the time, China spared the Philippines its bellicose rhetoric because Rodrigo Duterte, who was the president then, pursued a policy of appeasement.
The Economist came up with a “wolf warrior” index which showed that since mid-2022, the aggressive rhetoric has steadily fallen and in the beginning of 2025, the Chinese foreign ministry’s language had “softened to levels of cordiality not seen in the past six years…” This is because their confrontational diplomacy caused blowback, “soured relations with Australia and the EU, among others. Globally, public opinion on China tanked.”
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In the Philippines, China is among the least trusted countries. A Pulse Asia survey in December 2025 showed that only one in 10 Filipinos said they trust China, or a rating of 11%. Compare this to the US (82%), Japan (64%), Canada (58%), and Australia (51%), the top countries Filipinos trust.
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That AI thumbnail is so gross
wait until you read the rest of the article...